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CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAGE 
Joanna L. Grossman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Who is a legal parent? Advances in reproductive technology, 
the emergence of widespread lesbian and gay co-parenting, and 
the dramatic rise in non-marital childbearing have made it more 
difficult to determine which adults are legally tied to which 
children. Yet, sharper differentiation in constitutional terms 
between parents and non-parents has made the question of legal 
parentage even more important. It may seem obvious that the 
oldest of recognized privacy rights—the right of parents to the 
care, custody, and control of their children—would factor heavily 
in the determinations of something as important as parent-child 
relationships. But in the last few decades, during which parentage 
law has evolved at a breakneck pace, the role of constitutional 
parental rights has not always stayed front and center. This 
Article will bring those rights back to the foreground—showing 
the many ways in which constitutional parental rights haunt or 
help the development of parentage doctrine, which is as complex 
as the array of families it governs. 
As Justice O’Connor wrote in Troxel v. Granville, the 
“demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to 
speak of an average American family.”1 It is likewise difficult to 
speak of a typical parentage rule or a typical role for constitutional 
parental rights. Although sometimes invisible, constitutional 
protection for parental rights lurks in every determination of 
parentage. In some situations, those rights are the reason why a 
state must recognize a particular person or a category of people 
as legal parents. In others, those rights are the reason a person 
cannot be recognized as a parent. And in still others, it is an 
invisible force that quietly dictates the way parentage law has 
 
 * Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women and the Law and Professor of Law, 
SMU Dedman School of Law. 
 1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
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taken shape or the procedures it employs to determine which 
adults have the rights and obligations that come with legal parent 
status. 
One might observe that over the course of the last century, 
constitutional protection for parental rights has grown more 
robust. But one might also observe that the law of parentage—the 
set of rules and doctrines that determine who is a legal parent—
has expanded to at least potentially recognize a broader array of 
individuals as legal parents, including individuals such as unwed 
fathers, lesbian co-parents, intended parents, and sometimes even 
sperm donors. Yet little attention has been paid to the natural 
points of conflict between these two developments. When 
parental status is granted to one adult, the rights of any other legal 
parent are diluted. That’s not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, the 
other parent may have been the one to insist on recognition of the 
second parent. Or the legal parent’s sense of exclusivity may not 
have been warranted in the first instance. But parentage doctrine 
must square its rules with the constitutional protections to which 
any adult may legitimately lay claim. Courts, legislatures, 
advocates, and commentators need to be more explicit—and 
more careful—about how to account for those constitutional 
parental rights when determining parentage. 
In this Article, I will first chronicle the development of 
constitutional parental rights from the beginning to the end of the 
twentieth century. This part will explore the scope and origin of 
those rights, as well as the central role they played in the 
development of the broader right to privacy. Second, the Article 
will consider the initial clash between parental rights and 
parentage law, which took place in the 1970s and 1980s fight over 
the rights of illegitimate children and unwed fathers. In that era, 
the Supreme Court made clear that state parentage laws were 
constrained by federal constitutional protection for parental 
rights, a tension that had never before reached the courts. The 
final section explores four modern contexts in which 
constitutional parental rights and parentage law are most likely to 
cross paths—non-marital childbirth, sperm donation, surrogacy, 
and lesbian co-parenting. In each context, I consider the ways in 
which constitutional parental rights have—or should have—
affected the rules to determine which adults have rights and 
responsibilities with respect to which children. The influence of 
constitutional parental rights on parentage determinations is 
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discernible, but not always explicit, predictable, or a matter of 
consensus across different jurisdictions. By analyzing the concrete 
ways in which constitutional challenges have shaped parentage 
law, I hope to contribute to the development of such a system that 
does boast those characteristics. 
I. THE PROVENANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
It is a fundamental tenet of family law that parents are 
imbued with constitutionally protected rights, an idea cemented 
by a series of cases in the early twentieth century. This began with 
Meyer v. Nebraska, in 1923, in which the Court invalidated a 
Nebraska law banning instruction at home or in school in any 
foreign language before ninth grade.2 The state did have a right to 
try to “foster a homogeneous people with American ideals,” but 
it was not strong enough to override the parents’ right to have 
their children learn German.3 The Due Process Clause protects 
individual liberty, which “denotes not merely freedom from 
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy 
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”4 Nebraska’s restriction 
on foreign-language instruction materially interfered “with the 
power of parents to control the education of their own.”5 Without 
any evidence that the mere learning of a foreign language was 
harmful to children, or that the government had some particular 
expertise about this matter, the state had exceeded its power. Our 
system is not, the court noted, the one suggested by Plato, under 
which “no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his 
parent.”6 But this approach, though “deliberately approved by 
men of great genius” was based on “ideas touching the relation 
between individual and state [that] were wholly different from 
those upon which our institutions rest.”7 While the ancient Greeks 
trusted only the state to raise and inculcate ideal citizens, 
American states trust parents, who operate within a sphere of 
 
 2. 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923). 
 3. Id. at 402. 
 4. Id. at 399. 
 5. Id. at 401. 
 6. Id. at 401–02 (quoting Plato’s Commonwealth). 
 7. Id. at 402. 
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personal and family life that is protected from unnecessary 
governmental intrusion. Only when the child faces imminent risk 
of harm can the state intervene, which it does primarily through 
the child abuse and neglect system. Parents were “within the 
liberty of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment” when deciding 
whether to instruct their children in a foreign language.8 
This balance of power between parents and the state is a 
delicate one, but the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed that 
the weight tips heaviest in favor of the parents. The Court’s ruling 
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters followed just two years later.9 Here, 
the Court invalidated an Oregon law that required children 
between ages eight and sixteen to attend public school.10 States 
could require that children attend school. They could also 
regulate the schools and even the curriculum. But they could not 
insist that children be educated only in government-run schools.11 
A child was “not the mere creature of the state,” whose education 
could be standardized without regard for the desires of “those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny.”12 Parents, the Court 
wrote, “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
and prepare [children] for additional obligations.”13 That meant 
that the compulsory public education law in Oregon 
“unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians 
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.”14 
In the final piece of the trilogy, in 1944, the Court ruled in 
Prince v. Massachusetts that a child’s guardian—her aunt—could 
be convicted for allowing her niece to sell religious pamphlets on 
the street in violation of state labor law.15 Here, it was the child’s 
rights that were invoked, and they were not sufficiently strong to 
override the state’s interest in restricting child labor.16 The Court 
reaffirmed the super-parent role of the state, charged with 
protecting “the welfare of children,” but also made clear that 
power has to be balanced against “the parent’s claim to authority 
 
 8. Id. at 400. 
 9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 10. Id. at 534–36. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 535. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 534–35. 
 15. 321 U.S. 158, 163 (1944). 
 16. Id. 
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in her own household and in the rearing of her children.”17 Citing 
Meyer and Pierce, the Court now pronounced it “cardinal with us 
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation 
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”18 In this 
particular case, the Court found the state’s interest to outweigh 
the guardian’s; “child employment” is among those “evils” most 
likely to justify state intervention.19 
Those early cases stood not only for robust parental rights, 
but also as the foundation upon which a broad right of privacy 
would develop. As the Court wrote in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, a case in which it recognized the right to live with 
extended family, “A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer 
v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, have consistently 
acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state 
cannot enter.’”20 The Court returned to the scope of 
constitutionally protected parental rights in 2000, in Troxel v. 
Granville.21 There, a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote 
with a broad brush when it sharply limited the rights of non-
parents to seek visitation with children over the objection of a fit 
parent.22 
In Troxel, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Washington state statute that permitted 
“any person” to petition for visitation with a child and permitted 
courts to grant such petitions as long as it was in the best interests 
of the child.23 The trial court had granted substantial visitation to 
the paternal grandparents of two girls over the objection of their 
mother. The girls’ parents, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, 
had never married, but had cohabited and raised the children 
together during the early part of the children’s lives. The couple 
broke up in 1991, and Brad committed suicide in 1993. But for the 
two years in between, Brad lived with his parents and usually 
brought the girls to their house for his visitation weekends. After 
 
 17. Id. at 165.  
 18. Id. at 166. 
 19. Id. at 168. 
 20. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (citing cases about the right to marry, the right to avoid 
involuntary sterilization, the right to contraception and abortion, and the right to raise 
children).  
 21. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 22. Id. at 61–63. 
 23. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.09.240, 26.10.160(3) (1994). 
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Brad’s death, the Troxels sought to maintain substantial visitation 
with their granddaughters—a schedule that was more akin to that 
of a non-custodial parent than a grandparent. Tommie consented 
to some visitation, but Brad’s parents sued for more, which the 
trial court gave them.24 At the Supreme Court, a plurality of the 
Justices agreed with Tommie that Washington state’s third-party 
visitation law was unconstitutional as applied to her. The Troxel 
plurality began by noting that the “liberty interest at issue in this 
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of 
their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by this Court.”25 In the Meyer/Pierce/Prince 
trilogy, the Court had affirmed “that there is a constitutional 
dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children.”26 The right to raise one’s children is “essential”27 and 
“far more precious than any property right.”28 And in later cases, 
the Court had recognized specific instances in which parents 
might exercise those parental rights—and the limits placed on 
those rights.29 These rights are not absolute, and the state can 
temporarily or permanently override these rights when parents 
are proven unfit by clear and convincing evidence.30 A fit parent, 
however, must be presumed to be acting “in the best interests of 
their children.”31 The “natural bonds of affection”32 lead parents 
to act in just that way—leaving “no reason for the State to inject 
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the 
ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the 
rearing of that parent’s children.”33 
 
 24. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71. 
 25. Id. at 65. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
 28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982). 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 745 (right of procedural due process before involuntary 
termination of parental rights); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (right of a child not to 
be admitted to mental institution by parents without review by independent authority); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of Amish parents to cease formal education 
for their children after the eighth grade); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645 (right of unwed fathers 
not to be categorically disregarded as parents). 
 30. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
 31. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68; cf. In re Ta. L., 149 A.3d 1060, 1084 (D.C. 2016) (parents 
whose rights are still intact are entitled to have their preference for adoptive parents to be 
given great weight). 
 32. Troxel, 530 U.S at 68 (citing Parham, 442 U.S. at 602). 
 33. Id. at 68–69. 
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Encompassed within the right of “care, custody, and control” 
is the right to exclude. Just as parents have the right to decide 
where and how to educate their children, they have a right to 
decide in ordinary circumstances whether their children will have 
contact with other adults.34 But even fit parents do not have 
absolute power over their children or the relationships they are 
allowed to have with third parties. The balance between the rights 
of the parent who objects to continuing contact and those of the 
child and/or the third party is delicate, but, according to the Court 
in Troxel, must be clearly weighted in favor of the parent. As the 
plurality wrote in Troxel, the “problem here is not that the 
Washington Superior Court intervened, but that when it did so, it 
gave no special weight at all to Granville’s determination of her 
daughters’ best interests.”35 In the words of the plurality, a court 
must give “special weight” to a parent’s every decision, including 
one to deny visitation to a child’s grandparents, and the burden 
must lie with the non-parent rather than the parent.36 The 
Washington statute, by relying solely on the “best interests of the 
child,” without evidence of unfitness or even special 
circumstances, left too much room for courts to trammel the rights 
of fit parents. As applied to Tommie Granville’s decision to 
restrict visitation with her daughters’ paternal grandparents, the 
trial court constitutionally overstepped. 
Third parties, especially grandparents, can still sometimes 
win the right to visitation with someone else’s child, but the 
circumstances in which such a right will be acknowledged have 
narrowed.37 What drives these cases, and the statutes that underlie 
them, is the clear delineation between parent and non-parent. The 
third party seeking visitation typically does not claim to be a 
parent; thus, the constitutional hierarchy is clear. But what about 
someone who does claim to be a parent? The law’s conception of 
any individual’s parental status must account for the biological 
 
 34. Id. at 72 (awarding visitation to the children’s paternal grandparents “was an 
unconstitutional infringement on Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of her two daughters”). 
 35. Id. at 69. 
 36. Id. (finding fault with the trial court’s presumption that visitation was appropriate 
and forcing the mother to prove otherwise). 
 37. After Troxel, courts in many states faced challenges to their own third-party 
visitation laws. Some survived; some fell. Compare Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165 
(Ohio 2005) (upholding third-party visitation statute), and In re Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 
2004) (same), and Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002) (same) with Santi v. Santi, 
633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001) (invalidating third-party visitation statute).  
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mother’s parental rights. It does this, explicitly or implicitly, in 
different ways depending on the context. 
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN PARENTAL RIGHTS 
AND PARENTAL STATUS 
There can be no question after this clear and unambiguous 
line of cases that fit parents have constitutionally protected 
parental rights. But which adults qualify as parents who possess 
Meyer/Pierce/Troxel-type rights? That question has driven 
decades of litigation over parentage—who is a legal parent—in a 
wide variety of contexts. This section will explore the period in 
history when the Supreme Court first confronted the potential 
conflict between parental rights and parental status—and 
produced an array of opinions that set the parameters for many 
of the cases that have since followed. 
The most powerful rights-holder is the biological mother. 
Outside of an enforceable surrogacy arrangement, the act of 
giving birth almost always gives rise to legal motherhood.38 Unlike 
those of biological fathers, her rights cannot be undercut by her 
failure to act as a parent once the child is born (unmarried 
biological fathers) or by disproving the alleged genetic tie to the 
child (husbands without a biological tie to wives’ offspring). A 
woman who gives birth is a mother unless and until her rights are 
surrendered or involuntarily terminated due to abuse or neglect. 
Her rights are broad and, indisputably, include the right to “care, 
control, and custody” of her child. This includes, as a general 
matter, the right to decide with whom her child might develop 
relationships. 
Every child is given birth to by a mother. But when are that 
mother’s rights exclusive and when are they shared? Before 
Troxel, but many decades after the establishment of constitutional 
protection for parental rights, the Supreme Court grappled with 
the first conflict between parental rights and parentage law. For 
most of American history, unwed fathers were not considered the 
legal parents of their offspring. Identifying fathers as a source of 
support, through civil and criminal bastardy laws, came many 
 
 38. See, e.g, D.C. CODE § 16-909 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97(A) (West 
2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.735 (2017); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2002) (“The mother-child relationship is established between a woman and a 
child by . . . the woman’s having given birth to the child” unless otherwise provided in a 
rule permitting enforceable surrogacy agreements). 
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decades before any push to identify them because they might have 
rights.39 States typically bifurcated paternal status, leaving some 
men with obligations but not rights, and others with both. This 
system was the subject of several challenges in the 1970s, 
beginning with Stanley v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court 
considered whether Illinois had run afoul of the Due Process 
Clause by categorically excluding unwed fathers from the 
definition of “parent.”40 
Although parental rights were entrenched in constitutional 
privacy jurisprudence long before most other rights, the Court 
had never once been asked, until Stanley, whether they applied to 
unwed fathers. The question may not have arisen because the 
illegitimacy rate remained very low until the 1970s, estimated at 
only 1.8% in 1915; and only 3% in 1940.41 And many of those 
births were concealed from the father as well as the public, thus 
reducing the practical opportunities for men to assert claims to 
their out-of-wedlock children. A discernible trend towards non-
marital childbearing took hold in the 1970s, and the percentage of 
all children born to unmarried mothers reached 22% by 1985, 
32% by 1994, and plateaued around 40% in the 2010s, coming 
down from a peak of 43% in 2007.42 
There is no one explanation for this meteoric rise in non-
marital childbearing, but the second half of the twentieth century 
bore witness to the systematic dismantling of a system that had 
tried to confine all legitimate sex to marriage—and to ignore or 
criminalize the consequences when it took place in any other 
context. The developing right of privacy gave individuals control 
over contraception and abortion, and the Supreme Court 
explicitly extended such rights to unmarried couples.43 Non-
 
 39. 4 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 5 (1936). 
 40. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 41. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: 
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 96 (1994); Stephanie J. 
Ventura, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940–99, 48 NAT’L VITAL STAT. 
REP., no. 16, 2000. 
 42. See Ventura, supra note 41, at 17, tbl. 1; Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: 
Preliminary Data for 2015, 65 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 3, 2016, at 3–4, 10, tbl. 4. 
 43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy before a 
certain point); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of access to contraception for 
single adults); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of access to 
contraception for married couples). 
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marital cohabitation began to rise,44 and, eventually, states caught 
up to their residents by decriminalizing cohabitation and 
establishing the possibility of property-sharing rights between 
cohabitants.45 The stigma on unwed mothers precipitously 
declined.46 Legislators and courts continued to favor and promote 
sex and reproduction within marriage, but the practice of ignoring 
all other family forms began to subside. 
Illegitimate children struck the first blow to the traditional 
system. States reflexively drew stark and often harsh distinctions 
between children born to married and unmarried parents. Within 
a few years, the Supreme Court would strike down a number of 
these laws and establish that classifications on the basis of 
illegitimacy were entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.47 Despite the fact that states had gone to some 
lengths to penalize mothers for non-marital childbearing, neither 
legislatures nor courts seemed to question the existence of the 
legal mother-child relationship. The question was whether the 
state could allocate benefits differently on the basis of 
illegitimacy, not whether the woman was any less a mother 
because of the child’s status. After the Supreme Court was done 
dismantling the traditional system, it was clear that mothers had 
the same legal relationship to their non-marital children as to their 
marital children. This queued up a quite natural question: why 
was this not true for fathers, too? 
The Supreme Court tackled the questions surrounding the 
treatment of unwed fathers, beginning in 1972 with Stanley v. 
Illinois.48 Peter Stanley had lived intermittently with Joan Stanley 
and their three children. But when she died, the children were 
declared wards of the state, since, under Illinois law, they had no 
 
 44. See Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 
DEMOGRAPHY 615, 621 (1989).  
 45. On these developments, see JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 
124–141 (2011). 
 46. See generally ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN 
HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES 
BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006) (chronicling the strong social and family pressure for unwed 
women to give up children before adoption). 
 47. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Glona v. 
Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1968). 
 48. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
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surviving legal parent.49 He argued that the Illinois law that 
treated him as a stranger rather than a father violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Court was asked, in effect, whether 
constitutional parental rights include the right to be recognized as 
a parent in the first instance. 
The Court dealt first with the suggestion that states could 
simply refuse recognition to unwed fathers because of a 
preference for the traditional family. Such a suggestion was 
undermined by the Court’s recent decisions in the illegitimacy 
cases, however.50 As the Court observed, the state does not have 
unfettered discretion to draw the “‘legal’ lines [of parenthood] as 
it chooses.”51 The scope of those limits has driven, if sometimes 
only implicitly, the development of parentage law over almost half 
a century. 
With respect to unwed fathers, the Court concluded that 
Illinois had drawn with too broad and harsh a brush. The 
categorical rule of non-recognition actually undermined the 
state’s identified interests.52 Illinois aimed to protect “the moral, 
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best 
interests of the community” and to “strengthen the minor’s family 
ties whenever possible.”53 Yet, the law allowed children to be cut 
off from custodial, biological fathers (Stanley, e.g.) based solely 
on marital status. “[T]he State registers no gain towards its 
declared goals,” the Court wrote, “when it separates children 
from the custody of fit parents.” “Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, 
the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly 
separates him from his family.”54 The Court was not optimistic 
that many unwed fathers would make the grade—it may be that 
“most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents”—
but at least a select few are “wholly suited to have custody of their 
 
 49. Id. at 646. 
 50. Id. at 652 (internal citations omitted) (noting prior cases holding that “children 
cannot be denied the right of other children because familial bonds in such cases were 
often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized 
family unit”). 
 51. Id. (citing Glona, 391 U.S. at 73). 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. 
 54.  Id. at 652–53. 
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children.”55 Peter Stanley, in the Court’s view, was entitled to an 
opportunity to make his case as a father deserving of custody.56 
The parentage questions that have occupied courts in recent 
decades stem from the tension the Supreme Court first identified 
in Stanley between parentage laws that are typically left to state 
legislatures, on the one hand, and federal constitutional 
protection for parental rights, on the other. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTAGE IN THE NON-
TRADITIONAL FAMILY 
Parentage law has been challenged by each move away from 
the traditional family composed of married heterosexual spouses 
who conceive and raise children with biological ties to both of 
them. With each move—from marital to non-marital, from 
biological to functional parenting, and from heterosexual to 
homosexual adult relationships—courts have had to grapple with 
the indicia of parentage. Biology, marriage, intent, function, and 
contract have all emerged as possible bases on which to recognize 
legal parentage, but, in any given case, those factors can be in 
tension or even completely at odds with one another. This section 
will consider the development of parentage law in different 
contexts as it relates to constitutional protection for parental 
rights. 
A. UNWED FATHERS 
Stanley started the conversation about the constitutional 
parental rights of unwed fathers, but it took several additional 
cases to work out their contours. The Supreme Court revisited the 
parental rights of unwed fathers several times, asking which 
unwed fathers had the right to be treated like parents, with the 
constitutional right of “care, custody, and control” that came with 
the status. The Court continued to insist that unwed fatherhood 
not be categorically ignored, but began to hammer out the degree 
to which states could still differentiate between the parental rights 
of unwed mothers and those of unwed fathers. In Quilloin v. 
Walcott, the Court upheld a provision of the Georgia code that 
denied an unwed father the right to veto a proposed adoption.57 
 
 55. Id. at 654. 
 56. Id. 
 57. 434 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1978). 
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Georgia provided a mechanism for legitimation, but the father 
had not used it. Without legitimation, the Supreme Court wrote, 
“the mother is the only recognized parent and is given exclusive 
authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, including the 
power to veto adoption of the child.”58 Adoption by the child’s 
stepfather was approved over the objection of the child’s 
biological father. This stark differentiation between unwed 
mothers and unwed fathers seemed to violate the principles 
elucidated in Stanley just six years earlier, but the Court saw more 
substantial “countervailing interests” in this case.59 In Stanley, the 
choice was between the children’s remaining with their custodial, 
biological father or becoming wards of the state.60 His interest was 
“cognizable and substantial,” while the state’s interest in caring 
for children with a fit parent was “de minimis.”61 But here, the 
Court found the countervailing interest in cementing an existing, 
stable family unit, consisting of mother, child, and stepfather, was 
more substantial. 
In two later cases, the Supreme Court would further outline 
unwed fathers’ rights, sticking to the robust version suggested in 
Stanley. In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court invalidated a 
provision of New York law that gave unmarried mothers the 
exclusive right to consent to, or veto, the adoption of a child.62 
Abdiel Caban had fathered two children while living with their 
mother; he refused to consent when the mother married someone 
else and sought a stepparent adoption.63 The Court rejected New 
York’s defense that “a natural mother” usually has a “closer 
relationship with her child . . . than a father does” and insisted that 
unwed mothers and fathers be treated equally.64 Moreover, Caban 
had a much stronger claim as a social father than did the man in 
Quilloin. The Court left open the question whether unwed fathers 
would have the same equal claim to infants, with whom they had 
not yet developed a social or emotional relationship. Just four 
years later, though, the Court said no. 
In Lehr v. Robertson, the Court held that unwed fathers—
unlike unwed mothers—were not entitled automatically to full 
 
 58. Id. at 249. 
 59.  Id. at 247–48. 
 60. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658–59. 
 61. Id. at 651–52, 657–58. 
 62. 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). 
 63. Id. at 382. 
 64. Id. at 388–89. 
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parental rights.65 Women became full parents by giving birth, but 
men had to assert paternity and take advantage of the opportunity 
to develop an attachment with their biological children.66 This 
case involved an eight-month-old infant, born out of wedlock, 
who was adopted by her stepfather. Her biological father, 
Jonathan Lehr, objected that he did not receive notice or the 
chance to object. Like many other states, New York maintained a 
“putative father registry,” which gives unwed fathers the chance 
to notify the state of their intention to assert paternity over a 
child—or a potential child.67 Jonathan had neither registered, nor 
satisfied any other criteria to receive notice of his child’s 
adoption.68 He argued that a putative father’s “actual or potential 
relationship” with his child was a “liberty” protected by the 
Constitution, and that the differential treatment of unwed 
mothers and fathers was an equal protection violation.69 The 
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that Jonathan’s biological tie to 
Jessica was not enough to justify full constitutional protection of 
his parental rights.70 The Court distinguished between a 
“developed parent-child relationship,” and a potential one. The 
biological tie offers the natural father a unique opportunity to 
“develop a relationship” with the child, and if he “grasps that 
opportunity,” and accepts some “responsibility for the child’s 
future,” he may “enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship.”71 But if not, the Constitution will not “automatically 
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best 
interests lie.”72 
The unwed father cases both reinforced and fueled a shift in 
the conception of the non-marital family. Marriage and parentage 
became less entangled, and courts and legislatures began to 
rethink the parameters of parent-child relationships. The 
recognition of constitutional parental rights for fathers forced 
states to abandon their old systems, which gave little or no 
protection to unwed fathers, and replace them with statutory 
schemes that balanced fathers’ rights with the desire to facilitate 
 
 65. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
 66.  Id. at 250–52.  
 67. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2017). 
 68.  Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251–52. 
 69. Id. at 255. 
 70. Id. at 262. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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adoption where the mother sought it. The result was statutes that 
treat men as legal fathers only if they meet one of several 
criteria.73 This represented a shift away from marital status as a 
proxy for biological fatherhood and towards recognition of 
emerging as well as full-fledged father-child relationships, paving 
the way for many of the analogies urged and drawn in more 
complex family situations. 
In this long-running conflict over the treatment of unwed 
fathers, states struggled to maintain a system that did not impede 
adoption placements but was also sufficiently protective of the 
constitutional parental rights of unwed fathers. The genetic tie 
gives rise to a constitutional right to parent, which, in turn, sets 
the parameters for state parentage law. States cannot define 
parentage in a way that excludes men who grasped the 
opportunity to parent and earned constitutional parental rights. 
As we will see, some other conflicts between parental rights and 
parental status are harder to resolve because state parentage law 
often seeks to expand the parental status of a person without a 
constitutional claim to parental rights. That doesn’t prevent the 
state from acting, as a matter of policy, but it raises the possibility 
of intruding on the rights of an existing parent. 
B. SPERM DONORS 
In what ways do constitutional parental rights intersect with 
the law of sperm donors? In this context, states have been 
relatively aggressive about codifying parentage rules, in the hopes 
of creating certainty and predictability in a setting that, by 
definition, requires advance planning. But in their haste, many 
legislatures failed to account for the potential constitutional rights 
of men who might inadvertently have parental rights severed 
despite intending to retain them—or for the rights of mothers, 
whose desire to exclude the donor as a parent may be material to 
her willingness to conceive with donor sperm and reflect a life 
choice that deserves respect. These rights have arisen in litigation 
from both sides, forcing courts to grapple with the tension the 
legislatures ignored. 
States still vary significantly in their treatment of parentage 
in the context of sperm donation. Three-quarters of the states 
have a statute that applies a rule of non-paternity in at least some 
 
 73. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22–23 (2017). 
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situations. They vary in scope, although none apply to 
conceptions achieved through sexual intercourse. These statutes 
are all modeled on the presumption that a sperm “donor” is 
someone who provides sperm to a woman without the intent to 
parent any resulting child, and that she accepts the sperm without 
the intent to share parenting (at least not with the donor). What 
courts have added to this formula is that a donor who provides 
sperm with the intent to parent—and the mother accepted it on 
those terms—may be entitled, constitutionally, to be treated like 
other unwed fathers. 
The parentage question only arises with known donors. Most 
state sperm donor laws do not differentiate between known and 
unknown sperm donors on their face. And courts have tended to 
rule that non-paternity rules are not limited to anonymous 
donors. In other words, known donors can be precluded from 
establishing paternity even if there was a prior sexual relationship 
between the donor and the mother.74 Moreover, sperm donor 
statutes do not lend themselves to judicial discretion. They 
provide bright-line rules about when the non-paternity rule 
should be applied, and courts have tended to give them that effect. 
That is why William Marotta, who donated free sperm to a lesbian 
couple who found him on Craigslist, was deemed a legal father 
even though they had entered into a written agreement providing 
otherwise.75 Because the sperm donation was not done through a 
licensed physician, the Kansas non-paternity law did not apply. 
He is the legal father of the child and is obligated to provide 
support. 
The strict application of non-paternity rules invites 
constitutional challenges by some men who believe they have 
been misclassified as donors rather than dads. While no court has 
ever found a non-paternity rule to violate equal protection 
principles—the law supports at least modest distinctions between 
unwed mothers and unwed fathers based on the different 
biological roles in reproduction76—some courts have concluded, 
 
 74. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392, 394 (1986); Steven S. v. 
Deborah D., 127 Cal. App. 4th 319, 325 (2005); In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989); 
A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 763–64 (Fla. Ct. App. 2013); Lamaritata v. Lucas, 823 So. 
2d 316, 318–19 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002); McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 242–44 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
 75. State v. W.M., No. 12D2686, Kan. Dist. Ct. (Jan. 22, 2014). 
 76. See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1039 (Kan. 2007); McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 
244–45; L.F. v. Breit, 736 S.E.2d 711, 721 (Va. 2013). 
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or suggested in dicta, that a non-paternity rule might run afoul of 
substantive due process principles if applied to a known donor 
where he and the mother had clearly reached a pre-insemination 
agreement about joint parenting. To avoid constitutional 
problems, some courts have found that the non-paternity rule 
does not apply where the mother and donor clearly intended that 
the donor would be a father. In In re R.C., for example, the 
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when 
the unmarried recipient and the known donor at the time of 
insemination agree that the donor will be the natural father and 
act accordingly based on an express understanding that he will 
be treated as the father of any child so conceived, we concur 
with commentators, as well as [other] courts, that agreement 
and subsequent conduct are relevant to preserving the donor’s 
parental rights despite the existence of the statute.77 
The case was remanded for a determination whether the 
mother and donor had agreed at the time of insemination that the 
donor would be the father of any resulting child. “If no such 
agreement was present at the time of insemination, then [the non-
paternity rule] operates to extinguish [the donor’s] parental rights 
and duties . . . .”78 
In some cases, the clash between the statute and the 
constitution is unavoidable. Known donors have launched due 
process challenges when they have clear evidence of a mutual 
agreement to share parenting rights and responsibilities but are 
nonetheless barred from establishing paternity. These cases 
revolve around Lehr v. Robertson79 and the notion that unwed 
biological fathers cannot be deprived of parental rights unless 
they have failed to grasp the opportunity for a parent-child 
relationship. In In re K.M.H., for example, the Kansas Supreme 
Court considered the claim of a known donor, a friend of the 
mother, for parental rights.80 He claimed they had orally agreed 
 
 77. In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989). 
 78. Id.; see also C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1994) 
(holding that, in order to avoid constitutional questions, the non-paternity rule does not 
apply where a woman solicits a known donor and the parties agreed that the donor would 
have a relationship with the child); D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 334-41 (Fla. 2013) 
(holding the egg donor law of non-maternity would be unconstitutional as applied to a 
woman who provided the egg for a child carried by her partner with the intent to co-
parent). 
 79. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
 80. 169 P.3d at 1029. 
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that he would have a relationship with any child resulting from the 
insemination, but Kansas law applies a rule of non-paternity 
unless the donor and mother agreed otherwise in writing. The 
donor claimed that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to 
him because it recognized only written agreements regarding 
parental status and not oral ones. The court read Lehr to prevent 
a state from absolutely barring a biological parent from asserting 
parental rights, but distinguished the Kansas statute because of 
the opt-out provision. “Even a sperm donor with no relationship 
to a child’s mother can forge and protect his parental rights by 
insisting on a written agreement.”81 The court rejected the donor’s 
argument that the opt-out clause was too narrow because only 
written expressions of intent mattered, noting that a primary 
purpose of the parentage act was “to prevent the creation of 
parental status where it is not desired or expected.”82 
Sperm donor laws that do not permit an intended father to 
opt out of a rule of non-paternity may be unconstitutional. In L.F. 
v. Breit, the Virginia Supreme Court considered the claim of a 
known donor who had entered into a pre-insemination written 
agreement (and a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity 
executed by both biological parents after birth), but in a 
jurisdiction with no opt-out provision in the non-paternity rule.83 
The court concluded that the non-paternity rule nonetheless did 
not apply where “the biological mother and sperm donor were 
known to each other, lived together as a couple, jointly assumed 
rights and responsibilities, and voluntarily executed a statutorily 
prescribed acknowledgment of paternity.”84 The court suggested 
in dicta that the statute would have been unconstitutional as 
applied to the donor on due process grounds. 
The existing cases on the constitutional aspects of sperm 
donation have virtually all focused on the donor’s potential rights 
and whether his classification as a donor runs afoul of his parental 
rights. But these cases also potentially implicate the parental 
rights of the mother. If her rights include the right to exclude, then 
those cannot be diluted by recognition of the donor as a father 
unless she, too, intended that result at the time of insemination. 
Conception through sex gives both genetic parents the right to 
 
 81. Id. at 1040. 
 82. Id. at 1041. 
 83. 736 S.E.2d 711 (Va. 2013). 
 84. Id. at 720. 
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become parents, but when a woman relies on artificial 
insemination, and the donor is subject to a non-paternity rule, the 
child comes into this world with only one legal parent—the 
mother. Elevating the status of the donor can only be done 
consistently with her rights, perhaps on a theory of consent as 
discussed below for de facto parentage.85 
C. SURROGACY 
An increasingly popular type of family creation, surrogacy 
involves an agreement that one woman will conceive and carry a 
child for someone else to raise.86 In its traditional form, a woman 
conceived a child using her own egg and sperm from the husband 
of an infertile woman. In its modern form, the surrogate 
contributes no genetic material; in vitro fertilization is used to 
implant an embryo. The legal questions about surrogacy arise out 
of governing contracts that purport to assign parentage to 
someone other than the person designated by the traditional 
rules. Can parentage be relinquished—and assumed—prior to the 
birth of a child? Can one parent who contributes genetic material 
to the conception agree to share parentage with a partner who did 
not? After birth, the substitution of one set of legal parents for 
another would be governed by adoption law, with rules about the 
revocability of consent, screening of the adoptive parent, and so 
on. But surrogacy arrangements rely on the enforceability of the 
pre-conception agreement, without which the child would never 
have been brought into the world, and its ability to bind every 
party. Although constitutional parental rights are rarely 
mentioned in the context of surrogacy, they underlie the entire 
arrangement. 
The well-known Baby M. case brought the emerging issue of 
surrogacy into the public consciousness.87 There, a traditional 
surrogate, who had been paid $10,000 to conceive and gestate a 
child for another couple, refused to honor the agreement. The 
 
 85. See Jason P. v. Danielle S., 226 Cal. App. 4th 167, 176 (2014) (holding that the 
non-paternity rule precludes “a sperm donor from establishing paternity based upon his 
biological connection to the child”). 
 86. Amy Garrity, A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and 
Great Britain—A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 809, 809 (2000). 
 87. For a history of this case and its role in the surrogacy debate, see Elizabeth S. 
Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 
(2009); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby 
M., 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007). 
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case unfolded dramatically, culminating in a ruling from the New 
Jersey Supreme Court that the agreement was void as against 
public policy.88 With the contract deemed unenforceable, the 
traditional rules of parentage came into play. The child’s legal 
parents were her biological mother (the surrogate) and biological 
father (the sperm donor and intended father). Both the surrogate 
and the biological father had made unsuccessful constitutional 
claims. Mary Beth Whitehead argued that her parental rights 
could not be voluntarily relinquished prior to birth, nor 
involuntarily at any point without a showing of parental unfitness. 
She asserted that her right of procreation included the “right to 
the companionship of her child.”89 The court never reached her 
constitutional claim because it ruled that the surrogacy contract 
was unenforceable. The biological father asserted that his right to 
have children included the right to care, custody, and control of 
the child. The court rejected his claim because, if taken as far as 
he asserted, it would interfere with Whitehead’s comparable right 
of procreation. “[I]t would be to assert,” the court wrote, “that the 
constitutional right of procreation includes within it a 
constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone 
else’s right of procreation.”90 
A gestational carrier in the next big case, Johnson v. Calvert, 
argued that it would infringe her constitutionally protected 
parental rights to enforce the surrogacy contract and require her 
to relinquish parental status to the intended parents. The 
California Supreme Court rejected the argument because it 
“depends on a prior determination that she is indeed the child’s 
mother.”91 The question, then, was whether it was 
unconstitutional for the trial court to determine that she was not 
the child’s legal mother. With respect to that decision, the 
gestational carrier held constitutional interests, at best, that were 
“something less than those of a mother.”92 She did not have a 
genetic tie necessary to rely on the unwed father cases, and she 
did not have a separate liberty interest. There was no tradition of 
 
 88. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988). 
 89. Id. at 1253. 
 90. Id. at 1254. 
 91. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785–86 (Cal. 1993). California codified the 
ruling in Calvert, adopting a statute that expressly makes surrogacy agreements 
enforceable as long as they satisfy certain minimal conditions. See Cal. Fam. Code § 7962 
(2017). 
 92. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786. 
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protecting the “right of a woman who gestates and delivers a baby 
pursuant to an agreement with a couple who supply the zygote 
from which the baby develops and who intend to raise the child as 
their own.”93 Thus, she could not claim that she was directly 
protected by substantive due process principles. Moreover, the 
court concluded, “if we were to conclude that [the gestational 
carrier] enjoys some sort of liberty interest in the companionship 
of the child, then the liberty interests of [the intended parents], 
the child’s natural parents, in their procreative choices and their 
relationship with the child would perforce be infringed.”94 Thus, 
giving effect to the parties’ agreement about parentage “does not 
offend the state or federal Constitution;” enforceability is a 
question of public policy rather than a matter for constitutional 
debate.95 
The Baby M. ruling reverberated on a national scale, 
provoking a contentious public debate and a wide range of 
legislative responses that are still felt today. Today, almost thirty 
years later, surrogacy remains controversial for both same-sex 
and different-sex families, and states remain split over its 
legality.96 As gestational surrogacy has become the norm—the 
carrier provides only the womb, not the egg—some states have 
begun to permit surrogacy but to regulate it by statute.97 The 
debate continues, but little of the attention is on constitutional 
parameters. And perhaps this is appropriate, given that we permit 
parents to surrender parental rights by placing a child for 
adoption. If those rights could not be waived or surrendered, we 
would expect every adoption decree (and facilitating law) to be 
challenged on constitutional grounds. But we don’t. Courts have 
largely seen fit to recognize that no one’s constitutional rights are 
abridged by a state’s decision whether or not to permit 
enforcement of a surrogacy contract. 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.; see also C.M. v. M.C., 7 Cal. App. 5th 1188, 1203–05 (2017) (rejecting 
constitutional claims by gestational carrier).  
 95. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 778. 
 96. Compare, e.g., In re the Paternity of F.T.R, 833 N.W.2d 634 (Wis. 2013) (holding 
the surrogacy agreement entered by the parties as a valid and enforceable contract) with 
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding that surrogacy agreement between the 
surrogate mother and father was unenforceable); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. § 123 
(McKinney 1993) (prohibiting compensated surrogacy). 
 97. See, e.g., 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 47/5 (2017). 
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D. LESBIAN CO-PARENTS 
Litigation between lesbian co-parents over parental status—
and concomitant rights and responsibilities—represent the lion’s 
share of parentage litigation today. In broad brush, lesbians began 
co-parenting children before gay men did, and they remain much 
more likely to do so. Much of parentage law that has developed 
since the late 1980s has revolved around lesbian couples raising 
children with a genetic tie to one parent, but not the other.98 
Doctrinal development has been piecemeal not only because of 
the expected jurisdictional variation but also because of the 
dramatic change over time in parentage law and in the treatment 
of gay and lesbian individuals and families. Yet, it is crucially 
important given the sheer number of same-sex couples who are 
raising children together. An estimated 125,000 same-sex couples 
are raising nearly 220,000 children in the United States.99 How has 
constitutional protection for parental rights influenced the 
development of lesbian co-parent rights? Courts have reconciled 
the tension between parental rights and parental status in this 
context based on the notion of consent—that a biological mother 
can consent to the sharing of her constitutionally protected 
parental rights. Differences of judicial opinion about the forms 
that consent can take or how it can be measured account for a 
landscape that remains relatively chaotic despite many decades of 
work. 
1. Second-Parent Adoption 
A central site for conflicts between state parentage law and 
constitutional parental rights is in the decision whether to 
recognize a lesbian co-parent as having protected ties to her 
partner’s child. Although the two women may have undertaken 
and carried out parenting jointly, one of the women has full-blown 
parental rights and the other has no constitutionally recognized 
claim to parental status. Thus, the constitutional question is when 
and under what circumstances the parental rights of the biological 
mother can be shared—or must be shared. 
 
 98. Nancy D. Polikoff, Brief Amicus Curiae, R-Y v. Robin Y., N.Y. Cty. Fam. Ct. 
Docket No. P388491, reprinted in 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213, 219–20 n.2 
(1996) (citing documentation of early lesbian planned families). 
 99. GARY J. GATES, THE WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, LGBT 
PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2013). 
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Before the ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,100 in which the 
Supreme Court recognized that same-sex couples had a right to 
marry, lesbian couples began to use second-parent adoption to 
cement their family ties.101 This type of adoption is “modeled on 
step-parent adoption, a statutory scheme that allows a biological 
(or adoptive) parent’s spouse to adopt a child without terminating 
that parent’s rights, thereby leaving the child with two parents.”102 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was among the 
first to countenance second-parent adoption, in 1993, in Adoption 
of Tammy.103 Two women jointly petitioned to adopt the child to 
which one of them had given birth.104 The governing statute did 
not explicitly rule out adoption by an unmarried couple, and the 
court allowed it to take place given the overwhelming evidence of 
a stable family unit.105 The Supreme Court of Vermont had 
approved a lesbian second-parent adoption earlier that same 
year.106 After 1993, but before Obergefell in 2015, several states 
began to allow this type of adoption, either via statute or appellate 
court ruling, or at the trial court level without express authority.107 
Today, same-sex spouses should have the same access to 
stepparent adoption as different-sex spouses, as well as equal 
opportunity to jointly adopt a child.108 
Legislative and judicial approval of second-parent adoptions 
require two steps from the traditional parentage rules: (1) that a 
child can have two legal parents of the same sex; and (2) that a 
legal mother can allow her unmarried partner to adopt without 
severing her own ties with the child. For our purposes, the second 
 
 100. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 101. On the development of second-parent adoption for same-sex couples, see 
generally GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 320–29. 
 102. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. 
J.C.R. & C.L. 201, 2015 (2009); see also Erin J. Law, Taking a Critical Look at Second 
Parent Adoption, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 699, 701, 707 (1998). 
 103. 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993). 
 104.  Id. at 315. 
 105. Id. at 317–18. 
 106. See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993). 
 107. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 9-5-203(1), 19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 19-5-
211(1.5) (2012) (recognizing second-parent adoption); see also Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 
P.3d 554, 568, 572 (Cal. 2003) (allowing second-parent adoption and noting that twenty 
thousand such adoptions had already taken place in the state). 
 108. See Campaign for Southern Equality v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., 175 F. Supp. 
3d 691, 697 (D. Miss. 2016) (striking down last state law barring adoption by same-sex 
couples). 
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deviation is more important. Second-parent adoptions endorse 
the idea that a legal parent can waive the exclusivity of her 
parental rights—not only to a substitute parent as in a traditional 
adoption, but also to a joint parent. Express consent of the 
recognized parent plays a fundamental, indeed essential, role in 
second-parent adoptions. Adoption is the most secure form of 
parental status because adoption decrees are entitled to the most 
exacting form of full faith and credit.109 But can parentage also be 
shared through less formal mechanisms? This, too, requires some 
form of consent by the recognized parent. 
2. Shared Parental Rights by Agreement 
In just the past decade, several state supreme courts have 
held that co-parents can gain legal parent or quasi-parent status 
based solely on a co-parenting agreement with an unmarried 
partner. Boseman v. Jarrell grew out of the decision by Melissa 
and Julia, two women in a committed relationship, to have a 
child.110 The couple decided that Melissa would bear the child, but 
both women were involved in every stage of the process. A trial 
court approved their petition for a second-parent adoption in 
2005, even though the North Carolina Code did not expressly 
provide for one.111 The decree explicitly stated that it would create 
a full parent-child relationship between Julia and the child, while 
“not sever[ing] the relationship of parent and child between the 
individual adopted and that individual’s biological mother.”112 
The following year, the two women terminated their 
relationship, but Julia continued to support Melissa and the child. 
Melissa soon reduced Julia’s contact with the child, and Julia filed 
a complaint seeking custody. Melissa argued that the adoption 
decree was invalid because the judge exceeded his legal 
authority.113 Without the adoption, she argued, Julia was not a 
“parent” and could not seek custody. On appeal, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the adoption was void ab 
 
 109. See V.L. v. E.L., 136 S. Ct. 1017, 1021–22 (2016) (per curiam) (reversing a ruling 
from the Alabama Supreme Court refusing effect to a second-parent adoption decree from 
Georgia).  
 110. 704 S.E.2d 494 (N.C. 2010). 
 111. Id. at 497. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 498. 
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initio.114 This holding put Julia on tenuous footing as a non-parent, 
but the court felt she was not a typical third party. A parent can 
lose out, the court reasoned, on the absolute nature of parental 
rights, not only by demonstrating unfitness but also through a 
“voluntary grant of nonparent custody.”115 Melissa “intentionally 
and voluntarily created a family unit in which [Julia] was intended 
to act—and acted—as a parent,” with “no expectation that this 
family unit was only temporary.”116 She thus “acted inconsistently 
with her paramount parental status,” and was entitled to no 
special preference in a custody dispute with Julia.117 Julia, in 
effect, was entitled to joint custody without first obtaining the 
status of legal parent. 
In In re Mullen, the Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar 
conclusion.118 Like Melissa and Julia, Kelly and Michele had 
jointly participated in the planning, conception (including the 
expense of IVF), delivery, and raising of a child to which Kelly 
gave birth. Kelly and the sperm donor settled on an agreement 
providing that while his name would be listed on the birth 
certificate, he would not retain any parental rights or be obligated 
to support the child. Kelly executed a will and a health-care proxy 
in which she gave Michele the authority to act as Kelly’s agent 
with respect to the child. In these documents, Kelly stated that she 
was the legal parent, but that Michele was her “child’s co-parent 
in every way.”119 When the relationship ended, Michele filed a 
complaint for shared custody, in which she alleged that Kelly had 
“created a contract through her conduct with [her] to 
permanently share legal custody of the child.”120 The Ohio 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that denied 
Michele any rights as a parent or co-parent, but it made clear that 
a lesbian co-parent could acquire parenting rights by virtue of an 
enforceable shared-parenting agreement. The court confirmed 
that a “parent may voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, 
 
 114. Id. at 496.  
 115. Id. at 503. 
 116. Id. at 504. 
 117. Id. at 505; see also Eldredge v. Taylor, 339 P.3d 888, 894 (Okla. 2014) (upholding 
lesbian co-parenting agreement over constitutional objection of biological mother because 
she is presumed to have been acting in their best interests when she intended to raise them 
with a partner and signed agreements consenting to share her parental authority). 
 118. 953 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011). 
 119. Id. at 304. 
 120. Id.  
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custody, and control of his or her child through a valid shared-
custody agreement,” the essence of which “is the purposeful 
relinquishment of some portion of the parent’s right to exclusive 
custody of the child.”121 Such an agreement “recognizes the 
general principle that a parent can grant custody rights to a 
nonparent and will be bound by the agreement.”122 A valid 
shared-parenting agreement is enforceable as long as the co-
parent is a “proper person to assume the care, training, and 
education of the child,” and the agreement serves the child’s best 
interests.123 Michele simply did not have sufficient proof of an 
agreement. Although this approach disregards de facto parenting 
in many cases, the court felt that “the best way to safeguard both 
a parent’s and a nonparent’s rights with respect to children is to 
agree in writing as to how custody is to be shared, the manner in 
which it is shared, and the degree to which it may be revocable or 
permanent.”124 
Finally, in Frazier v. Goudschaal,125 the Kansas Supreme 
Court also ruled that enforceable parental rights could be created 
by contract. The two women in that case had entered into written 
co-parenting agreements prior to the birth of each of two children, 
which provided that the non-biological parent would be a “de 
facto parent” and that her “relationship with the children should 
be protected and promoted;” that the parties intended to “jointly 
and equally share parental responsibility;” that expenses of 
childrearing should be borne proportionately relative to income; 
and that in the event of a separation “the person who has actual 
physical custody w[ould] take all steps necessary to maximize the 
other’s visitation” with the children.126 Over the objection of the 
biological mother, the court read the Kansas Parentage Act to 
permit enforcement of shared parental rights.127 
Together, these cases set a strong precedent for the sharing 
of parental rights despite the traditional rules of parentage law. 
De facto parentage, which is taken up in the following section, 
accomplishes a similar result through different means. 
 
 121. Id. at 305–06. 
 122. Id. at 306. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 308. 
 125. 295 P.3d 542 (Kan. 2013). 
 126. Id. at 546. 
 127. Id. at 558. 
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3. De Facto Parentage 
The third doctrine for lesbian co-parents that raises 
constitutional issues is de facto parentage. De facto parentage 
enables an adult without any formal legal ties to a child to be 
granted legal parent, or at least parent-like, status based on 
functional parentage.128 It presents one of the more complicated 
clashes between parental rights and parental status because it 
relies on conduct rather than formal expressions of consent by the 
biological mother. But it also introduces the possibility that 
lesbian co-parents have an inchoate right to be recognized, akin 
though not equivalent to the rights vested in unwed biological 
fathers. 
The first appellate case to recognize a lesbian co-parent as a 
“de facto parent” was In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.129 In this 1995 
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on this concept to allow 
a lesbian co-parent, who was not related to the child by blood or 
adoption, to seek visitation over the objection of the child’s 
biological mother. In what today feels like a familiar story, 
Elsbeth and Sandra were intimate partners and planned together 
to start a family. The women participated equally in every aspect 
of planning for and parenting a child during the first four years of 
the child’s life. But when the two women broke off their 
relationship, Elsbeth cut off contact between Sandra and the 
child. In a suit for custody and visitation, Sandra sought to be 
recognized as functional parent. Her claim did not fit nicely into 
the state family law code, yet, the state’s highest court concluded 
that she had standing to seek visitation with the child.130 Taken 
together, the statutes governing custody and visitation showed the 
“continuing legislative concern with identifying the triggering 
events that warrant state interference in an otherwise protected 
parent-child relationship.”131 The court recognized an equitable 
right for Sandra to seek visitation based on her functional parent-
 
 128. States differ as to the scope of rights held by a de facto parent. Compare V.C. v. 
M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the psychological parent “stands in 
parity with the legal parent,” and “[c]ustody and visitation issues between them are to be 
determined on a best interests standard”) with In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 
423–24 (Wis. 1995) (noting that custody, as opposed to mere visitation, cannot be granted 
to a de facto parent without evidence that the legal parent is unfit). 
 129. 533 N.W.2d at 420–21. 
 130. Id. at 435.  
 131. Id. at 427.  
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child relationship.132 Elsbeth argued that any recognition of the 
relationship between Sandra and the child over Elsbeth’s 
objection would violate her constitutional parental rights.133 But 
the court observed that those rights are not absolute; state public 
policy “directs the court to respect and protect parental autonomy 
and at the same time to serve the best interest of the child.”134 
In this type of case, the balance was struck by allowing a court 
to hear a petition for visitation when “it determines that the 
petitioner has a parent-like relationship with the child and that a 
significant triggering event justifies state intervention in the 
child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.”135 The 
parent-like relationship is established through four elements: (1) 
consent by the biological parent to foster the formation of the 
parent-child relationship; (2) living in the same household with 
the child; (3) assuming the obligations of parenthood, including 
support and childrearing; and (4) sufficient duration to establish 
“with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in 
nature.”136 The triggering event, in turn, must be established with 
proof that the biological parent interfered with the petitioner’s 
parent-like relationship and that the petitioner sought court-
ordered visitation “within a reasonable time.”137 Once 
established, the de facto parent must also show that visitation is in 
the child’s best interests.138 
 This test became the gold standard for de facto 
parentage.139 Recognition of de facto parentage, however, is not 
universal. Several states have rejected it outright.140 Their chief 
 
 132. Id. at 425–36. 
 133. Id. at 434. 
 134. Id. at 435.  
 135. Id. at 421. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 436. 
 138. See id. at 421. 
 139. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559–60 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Rubano v. 
DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000). Several other states adopted the doctrine of de 
facto parentage without strictly adhering to the Wisconsin test. See, e.g., Kulstad v. 
Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009); Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007); 
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999). 
 140. See, e.g., Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999); Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Matter of 
Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320–21 (Ill. App. 1999); Matter of Visitation with 
C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. 1999); B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Ky. 2006); In re 
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 809–10 
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concern is intruding on the rights of the biological mother, in 
violation of her constitutionally protected parental rights.141 For 
example, a court of appeals in Louisiana reasoned de facto 
parentage should be rejected because a mother’s “paramount 
right of a parent in the care, custody, and control of his or [sic] 
child” can be abrogated only in “rare circumstances.”142 The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine simply because it “would 
abrogate a portion of the [biological mother’s] parental rights.”143 
Are these courts right that de facto parentage presents an 
irreconcilable conflict with the biological mother’s constitutional 
parental rights? One constitutional objection to the doctrine is 
that lesbian co-parents are third parties unless and until the 
parent-child relationship is cemented through adoption or some 
other formal mechanism. And, in a dispute over custody or 
visitation, the parent and non-parent are not on equal footing; 
their dispute cannot constitutionally be resolved based solely on 
the best interests of the child. 
In Stadter v. Siperko,144 for example, a Virginia court ruled 
that a lesbian co-parent was, for Troxel purposes, like any other 
third party seeking to override the wishes of a fit parent. Despite 
equal participation in all aspects of planning for and raising the 
child, the co-parent was not entitled to the more lenient “parent-
standard” when in a dispute with the biological mother. Rather, 
she could gain visitation over the mother’s objection only if the 
mother had “voluntarily relinquished” custody to the non-parent 
or if clear and convincing evidence established that a “denial of 
visitation would be harmful or detrimental to the welfare of the 
child.”145 The Stadter court refused to recognize de facto 
parentage as a means of rebutting the Troxel presumption that the 
fit parent’s decision to deny visitation was the right one.146 
Have courts been hasty in assuming that recognition of the 
doctrine of de facto parentage is inconsistent with the biological 
 
(Utah 2007); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 
494, 499–501 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). 
 141. See, e.g., Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918–19; Jones, 154 P.3d at 819. 
 142. Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 143. Jones, 154 P.3d at 819. 
 144. 661 S.E.2d 494 (Va. Ct. App. 2008). 
 145. Id. at 498.  
 146. Id. at 498–99; see also Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Me. 2014) (recognizing 
a de facto parent only “when the failure or refusal to so determine will result in harm to 
the child” because the “intrusion into a parent’s fundamental rights is substantial”). 
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mother’s constitutional parental rights? As we have seen in the 
context of adoption and co-parenting agreements, a legal parent 
can consent to share parental rights with a co-parent. So maybe 
the question should only be whether that consent can be 
adequately measured outside of a formal adoption process or a 
written co-parenting agreement. As the court noted in In re 
H.S.H.-K, “[t]hrough consent, a biological or adoptive parent 
exercises his or her constitutional right of parental autonomy to 
allow another adult to develop a parent-like relationship with the 
child.”147 Adopting the same test in a lesbian co-parent case, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that the first prong “is 
critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a 
participant in the creation of the psychological parent’s 
relationship with the child;” by fostering the relationship, “the 
legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental 
authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and 
duties vis-à-vis the child that the third party’s status would not 
otherwise warrant.”148 The parent can protect “a zone of 
autonomous privacy,” but, once ceded, she loses the right to 
terminate the parent-child relationship unilaterally.149 
Perhaps the best way to think about de facto parentage is not 
as a dispute in which a parent has consented to share rights with a 
non-parent, but as a dispute in which both women are rights-
holding parents based on their intent to parent and actual 
parenting contributions. In a dispute between two fit parents, 
disputes can be resolved by a simple best-interests analysis—thus 
bypassing the constitutional problem altogether. When the 
Washington Supreme Court adopted de facto parentage in In re 
Parentage of L.B., it concluded that “Troxel does not establish 
that recognition of a de facto parentage right infringes on the 
liberty interests of a biological or adoptive parent.”150 If the co-
parent meets the criteria to be a de facto parent, then the 
 
 147. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 436 n.40 (Wis. 1995). 
 148. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000). 
 149. Id.; see also Gordius v. Kelley, 139 A.3d 928, 930 (Me. 2016) (noting that a claim 
of de facto parentage is one of the situations “that will interfere with the normal parent-
child relationship” in a way that is “constitutionally permitted”); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 
A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000) (by allowing her partner to “assume an equal role as one of the 
child’s two parents,” a biological mother “rendered her own parental rights with respect 
to this boy less exclusive and less exclusory than they otherwise would have been had she 
not by word and deed allowed [her partner] to establish a parental bond with the child and 
then agreed to allow reasonable visitation”). 
 150. 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005). 
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biological mother and the co-parent “would both have a 
‘fundamental liberty interest[]’ in the ‘care, custody, and control’ 
of [the child].”151 Troxel, the Washington court wrote, “did not 
address the issue of state law determinations of ‘parents’ and 
‘families’” and does not “place any constitutional limitations on 
the ability of states to legislatively, or through their common law, 
define a parent or family.”152 Parentage, in other words, is a 
threshold determination that precedes the exercise of parental 
rights. The Delaware Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
in Smith v. Guest, explaining that a de facto parent’s claim is not 
like that of a “third party having no claim to a parent-child 
relationship.”153 Rather, the plaintiff in that case is a “de facto 
parent who . . . would also be a legal ‘parent’” and would thus have 
a “co-equal ‘fundamental parental interest’” in raising the child.154 
Allowing her “to pursue that interest through a legally-recognized 
channel cannot unconstitutionally infringe Smith’s due process 
rights.”155 
In two recent, noteworthy opinions, state supreme courts 
reversed themselves by adopting the de facto parentage doctrine 
after having explicitly rejected it. In both cases, the shift reflects a 
difference in the view of the co-parent—as an individual with 
inchoate parental rights rather than as a third party. In Maryland, 
the state’s highest court had held in Janice M. v. Margaret K. that 
the doctrine was not a viable means for a lesbian co-parent to 
petition for custody or visitation.156 The court characterized the 
case as a dispute between a fit parent and a third party and found 
the plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville instructive: the parent 
is asserting a constitutional right—the right to exclude—and the 
“third party” is not.157 In such a dispute, the non-parent can only 
prevail by proving the unfitness of the parent or the existence of 
 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. Kennedy suggested this line of reasoning in his dissent in Troxel. See Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 100–01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“a fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a 
complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto parent may 
be another”) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 98 (“Cases are sure to arise—perhaps a 
substantial number of cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a 
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily 
subject to absolute parental veto.”). 
 153. 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008). 
 157. Id. at 81. 
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“exceptional circumstances.” It thus refused to “recognize de 
facto parent status.”158 In 2016, however, the Maryland court 
reversed itself, ruling in Conover v. Conover that de facto 
parentage is a viable basis for standing to petition for custody or 
visitation.159 The key to the shift was in re-characterizing the 
would-be de facto parent as something other than a “pure third 
party.” People in a “parental role” stand above the world of true 
third parties and are entitled to have the parent-like relationship 
considered in the determination of legal status.160 Thus, the 
de facto parent doctrine does not contravene the principle that 
legal parents have a fundamental right to direct and govern the 
care, custody, and control of their children because a legal 
parent does not have a right to voluntarily cultivate their child’s 
parental-type relationship with a third party and then seek to 
extinguish it.161 
The evolution in New York was similar to Maryland, only 
there the state’s highest court had twice rejected the doctrine of 
de facto parentage, seventeen years apart. In Alison D. v. Virginia 
M., one of the first cases in which lesbian co-parent rights were 
litigated, the court held that a mother’s lesbian partner was not a 
“parent” within the meaning of the custody and visitation 
statute.162 When the court agreed to review a case presenting the 
same issue in 2010, it was widely expected that it would reverse 
itself—given the dramatic change in the law and social norms 
surrounding parenting by same-sex couples. But it did not. In 
Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York Court of Appeals again 
rejected the doctrine of de facto parentage in order to promote 
“certainty in the wake of domestic breakups” and avoid 
“disruptive battles over parentage.”163 Just six years later, though, 
the same court finally reversed itself, holding in Brooke S.B. v. 
 
 158. Id. at 87. 
 159. 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016). 
 160. Id. at 443. 
 161. Id. at 447; see also A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 885–92 (Haw. 2016) (adoptive 
parent who chose to share physical custody and parenting responsibilities with a same-sex 
co-parent “does not have a protected privacy interest in excluding [the co-parent] from 
[the] [c]hild’s life” under the state or federal constitution); R.M. v. T.A., 233 Cal. App. 4th 
760, 776 (2015) (when “a two parent relationship has in fact been developed with the 
child,” “the interests of the child in maintaining the second parental relationship can 
properly take precedence over one parent’s claimed desire to raise the child alone.”); 
Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their 
Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014). 
 162. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). 
 163. 930 N.E.2d 184, 191–92 (N.Y. 2010). 
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Elizabeth A.C.C. that “where a petitioner proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that he or she has agreed with the biological 
parent of the child to conceive and raise the child as co-parents, 
the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to achieve 
standing to seek custody and visitation of the child.”164 The court 
expressly reserved the question whether a co-parent who came 
onto the scene after conception of the child could be treated as a 
de facto parent, opting for a narrow holding that would “protect 
the substantial and fundamental right of biological or adoptive 
parents to control the upbringing of their children.”165 Like the 
Maryland court, the New York court created a path to de facto 
parentage by recharacterizing the co-parent’s claim. “[H]ere,” the 
court wrote, “we do not consider whether to allow a third party to 
contest or infringe on those rights; rather, the issue is who 
qualifies as a ‘parent’ with coequal rights.”166 
The approaches taken by the Maryland and New York courts 
in recent cases are perhaps illustrative of a trend, but they do not 
yet represent a universal position. Consent has emerged as an 
increasingly important concept in the sharing of parental rights, 
but the question remains open whether a non-biological parent 
might have rights akin to those of, say, an unwed father, but 
rooted in intent and function rather than reliance.167 
CONCLUSION 
Although we are many decades removed from Stanley v. 
Illinois and the Supreme Court’s observation that parentage rules 
must themselves be constitutional, parentage law is still in a state 
of relative chaos. There remains significant jurisdictional 
variation in almost every rule of parentage, and it is hard for 
individuals to predict whether the children they create and the 
relationships they nurture will be protected by law. This 
uncertainty is aggravated by the complicated role that 
constitutional parental rights can play in parentage 
determinations—sometimes requiring the recognition of a parent, 
 
 164. 61 N.E.3d 488, 501 (N.Y. 2016). 
 165. Id. at 499. 
 166. Id. 
 167. But see, e.g., Russell v. Pasik, 178 So. 3d 55, 60 (Fla. 2015) (rejecting the argument 
that an intentional co-parent may have some constitutional interest in being a parent akin 
to the “inchoate right to be a parent” possessed by an adult with a biological or legal 
connection to a child). 
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sometimes precluding it, and other times invisibly or quietly 
undergirding the decision. But vagueness about when, where, and 
how constitutional parental rights are relevant to parentage is 
unacceptable given what is at stake for parents and children. As a 
starting point, this Article steps through the case law and 
intersecting statutory rules of parentage to map out the current 
landscape—a tedious process, to be sure, but a necessary one. 
What this analysis reveals is that while courts are generally 
cognizant of constitutional parental rights and their potential 
relevance to parentage determinations, they do not always 
grapple with those rights in ways that reflect a full grasp of their 
importance or a consensus on the best way to resolve the points 
of tension. Lawmakers and courts need to more explicitly account 
for parental rights when determining parental status, and scholars 
need to lay the groundwork for resolving the tensions between the 
two. 
 
